proofheldTrust starts with precise claims.
Know what
the record proves.
Security is a system to validate. Evidence is a record to inspect. Both need more than a badge.
Fictional sample PDFs, byte counts, SHA-256 fingerprints, a generated-at UTC time, printable report and JSON manifest.
Production identity, secure exchange, recipient-bound receipts, email notifications, signing keys, independent timestamps and durable ledger custody.
Reading an exchange record
Each status answers a different question.
- Sample inventory: generated
- The fictional files have been listed and fingerprinted. This does not record a real exchange.
- Recipient identity: not authenticated
- No recipient has signed in or proved their identity in this sample.
- Transfer completed: not performed
- No document transfer has taken place through this website.
- Recipient hash check: not performed
- No recipient has checked a received copy against the original fingerprint here.
- Express acknowledgment: not recorded
- No recipient has explicitly acknowledged receipt.
- Independent timestamp: not issued
- No outside timestamp proof has been issued for this sample record.
Two layers.
Different jobs.
Private exchange
The proposed FileSender host stores temporary encrypted transfer files on a dedicated local computer. Authorized participants retain originals and their receipts. The public website is separate.
Public commitment
A privacy-reviewed, randomized commitment to a batch of private records is the proposed public evidence. No names, filenames, document contents or raw individual document hashes should be published for a private exchange.
Publishing a raw hash can reveal that two people hold the same known file. A hash is a fingerprint, not encryption. Private proofs and recovery copies need their own access controls.
Independent evidence, built on established tools.
OpenTimestamps
Candidate for independent Bitcoin-anchored time proofs. Its free calendar service accepts commitments. Pending proofs must be upgraded and verified before being labeled confirmed. Project documentation ↗
pyHanko
Candidate for PDF digital signatures and trusted timestamp workflows. A visible seal is only an appearance; certificate trust, key protection and signature validation still matter. Project repository ↗
FileSender
The proposed open-source transfer component. The public website does not run FileSender. Its configuration and the combined system require independent review and end-to-end testing. Project repository ↗
What a time proof does not prove.
An independently verified timestamp can support that committed data existed before a point in time. It cannot by itself establish the precise delivery time, the identity of a recipient, whether an event was honestly recorded or whether the log contains every event.
Hash chaining can make edits detectable when compared with independently held checkpoints. It does not prevent an administrator from rewriting an unanchored history, deleting records or omitting new events. Durable independent copies, signed checkpoints and tested recovery are part of the proposed design.
Current security status
The beta website currently provides a sample workspace only. The integrated product has not passed production acceptance or an independent security audit. No certification, court endorsement or immutable-ledger guarantee is claimed.
Inspect the sample record